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An Inframarginal Analysis of the Heckscher-Olin Model
with Transaction Costs and Technological Comparative Advantage
Wenli Cheng, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Xiaokay Yang
1. Introduction
This paper introduces technological comparative advantage and transaction costs into the
Heckscher-Olin model and refines the four core theorems in trade theory, namely, the Heckscher-
Olin (HO) theorem, Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem, factor equalization theorem, and
Rybczynski (RY) theorem
1.
In the standard HO model, it is assumed that trading countries share identical
technologies. This assumption is obviously inconsistent with empirical observation, and it has
contributed to the poor empirical performance of the HO theorem.  According to Trefler (1995),
the HO theorem is consistent with empirical findings only 50% of the time. Despite the
unsatisfactory performance, the HO theorem has retained its dominance in international
economics simply because economists have not found anything that performs better (Bowen et.
al., 1987).   In a recent attempt to improve the performance of the HO theorem, Trefler (1995)
demonstrated empirically that a modification is desirable that allows for consumption bias and
technology difference between countries.
To complement Trefler’s work, we introduce technology differences between countries to
the traditional HO model.  We shall show that if the trading countries differ in both productivity
and factor endowments, the equilibrium trade pattern may be opposite to what the traditional HO
theorem predicts; and we shall propose a refined HO theorem.
Recently reviving interests in the effects of international trade on domestic income
distribution (see, for instance, Krugman, 1995 and Sachs, 1996) motivate our refinement of the
SS theorem in an extended HO model. The SS theorem was used to justify tariffs as an
instrument to improve domestic income distribution (Samuelson, 1953). However, our extended
                                                
1 The background of the SS theorem and related core trade theorems, their extensions, empirical tests, reflections
about them, and a comprehensive annotated bibliography can be found in Deardorff and Stern (1994). The research
to extend the HO model by introducing more goods, factors, and countries can be found from Melvin (1968) and
Ethier (1974).2
model shows that within a certain parameter subspace, the common sense is closer to reality than
the SS theorem. The common sense indicates that tariff and associated transaction costs may
marginally improve domestic income distribution, but it may inframarginally cause the general
equilibrium to jump from a trade structure with high trade dependence and high productivity to a
structure in which productivity is low and home residents receive little gains from trade. The net
effect of the transaction cost depends on whether the marginal effect dominates inframarginal
effect.
The four core theorems are derived from the traditional 2·2·2 HO model.  The model has
some standard neoclassical assumptions (such as perfect competition and constant return to
scale) and several somewhat restrictive assumptions (which will be discussed later).  Given its
assumptions, the theorems do not require specific functional forms; yet, they are able to identify
several regularities in general equilibrium comparative statics.
But our extended model explicitly specifies the Cobb-Douglas utility and production
functions. There are two reasons for assuming specific functional forms. First, the trade off
between tractability, generality of functional forms, and generality of other aspects of the model
implies that introduction of technological comparative advantage and transaction costs must be at
the cost of generality of functional form. Second, a well-known theorem in general equilibrium
theory states that in the absence of explicit model specifications, we can say nothing about the
properties of the equilibrium comparative statics except that Walras’ law holds, and that the
excess demand function is homogenous of degree zero (See Sonnenschein, 1973, Mantel, 1974,
and Debreu, 1974).  We will use the HO model with Cobb-Douglas utility and production
functions to show that some of the core theorems may not hold even in the original HO model
with no technological comparative advantage and transaction costs.
When some economists prove the SS and RY theorems, they assume that the trading
countries are small, thus each country is a price taker, and the equilibrium prices of goods can be
treated as exogenous. Sometimes the equilibrium prices of factors are treated as exogenous when
the HO theorem is proved (Dixit and Norman, 1980 and Jones, 1965).  Since exogenous product
or factor prices exclude from the analysis the interactions between prices and other parameters
(such as endowment), the general equilibrium comparative statics become less unambiguous.
However, it is unjustified to infer exogenous prices of goods or factors from the small country3
assumption for the same reason that perfect competition (price taking behavior) cannot be used to
justify exogenous equilibrium prices in a general equilibrium model.  In this paper prices of
goods and factors in the HO model are endogenously determined.  With endogenous prices, the
core theorems of trade theory may or may not hold; certainly they cannot be derived in the same
way as in the traditional way.
2
As depicted in Figure 1, there are 8 possible trade structures in the HO model.  Only the
first 2 structures involve incomplete specialization for both countries.  The last 6 structures
involve complete specialisation in at least one country.  We can refer to the first 2 structures as
interior structures since the output choices of each goods for both countries are strictly positive,
ie, they are based on interior solutions.  And the last 6 structures can be referred to as corner
structures as at least one country chooses zero value of output level of one good, ie, corner
solutions are involved.
To find the general equilibrium of the model, we need to know which of the 8 structures
(or trade patterns) occurs within which parameter subspace and also the prices and quantities in
that structure.  Correspondingly, the comparative statics analysis of general equilibrium should
investigate not only marginal changes of quantities and prices in response to parameter changes
within each structure, but also inframarginal changes (discontinuous jumps) of trade patterns
across structures as parameters reach some critical values (or as parameter values shift between
parameter subspaces that demarcate the structures). The comparative statics that relate to changes
within a given structure are referred to as marginal comparative statics and those related to
changes between structures are referred to as inframarginal comparative statics.
For some purposes, inframarginal comparative statics are more important than marginal
comparative statics since the latter involve only marginal changes in quantities and prices within
a trade structure, while the former involve discontinuous jumps of all endogenous variables
including prices and quantities as well as changes of trade structure.  For instance, marginal
comparative statics may indicate that a tariff benefits labor which is a scarce factor in home
country, but inframarginal comparative statics may indicate that the tariff may cause
                                                
2 Wong (1995, pp. 91-97) uses the RY theorem to prove the HO theorem with no assumption of exogenous factor
prices. But he proves the RY theorem using the assumption of exogenous product prices. As we will show later that
it is not legitimate to assume exogenous product prices in order to work out comparative statics of general
equilibrium and to prove the RY theorem.4
inframarginal jump of trade structure, so that the cost of the tariff to workers may outweigh its
benefit.
In some work, inframarginal changes of trade structure (shifts of equilibrium from or to
the diversification cone) are explained by changes in prices. Since comparative statics of general
equilibrium explain changes of equilibrium values of all endogenous variables including prices
by changes in parameters, it is not legitimate to explain inframarginal changes of trade structure
by changes in prices which themselves should be explained by parameter changes. In this paper,
we will explicitly solve for inframarginal comparative statics of general equilibrium by
partitioning parameter space into subspaces. 
3
The parameter subspace within which an unambiguous negative sign of the derivative of
the equilibrium value of an endogenous variable with respect to a parameter occurs may have no
intersection set with the parameter subspace within which the trade pattern concerned is the
general equilibrium. This implies that identifying the sign of the derivative is not enough and the
partition of the parameter space is essential for working out the comparative statics of general
equilibrium. But the implications of the partition of the parameter space did not receive deserved
attention when the four core theorems were proved.
The main findings of this paper are: (1) the HO theorem continues to hold when prices of
goods and factors are endogenized and inframargianl comparative statics of general equilibrium
are considered, though it needs to be refined when transaction costs or differences in technology
are introduced; (2) the SS theorem remains valid within the diversification cone if the changes in
prices are due to a change in taste or endowment, but no longer holds if the changes in prices are
due to changes in production or transaction cost parameters; (3) the part of the RY theorem
which states that an increase in a factor endowment leads to an expansion of the sector that uses
the factor intensively remains valid, but the other part which states that such an increase leads to
a contraction of the other sector is no longer true; (4) the factor price equalization theorem does
not always hold within the diversification cone if transaction costs and differences in technology
are introduced.
                                                
3 The distinction between comparative statics of decision and comparative statics of equilibrium implies that
comparative statics of equilibrium should not explain changes in equilibrium by changes in prices despite the
legitimacy of explaining quantities demanded by prices.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the HO model that
incorporates technology differences and transaction costs and checks the validity of the HO
theorem.  Section 3 discusses the concept of the diversification cone and analyzes the conditions
for factor price equalization in the extended model.  Sections 4 and 5 check the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem, respectively, in the extended model.  Section 6
analyzes effects of the introduction of transaction costs on the core theorems. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2.  The HO model with transaction costs and differences in technology
In this section, we develop an HO model with two countries differing in production
technology and transaction conditions.  The assumptions are similar to those in a standard 2·2·2
HO model, namely, that perfect competition prevails in both goods and factor markets; that
factors are mobile within a country but immobile between countries; that factors are fully
employed; and that the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
We start by finding the autarky product price in each country as reference, and then
proceed to solve for the trade equilibrium.
2.1. Autarky
Assume that country i (i =1, 2) is endowed with labor Li and capital Ki, which can be used to
produce two consumer goods X and Y. In autarky, the decision problem of a representative
consumer in country i is
max
. .
, x y i i i
i i i i i i
i i
U x y
s t px y w L r K
=
+ = +
- q q 1
   (1)
where p  is the price of good X in terms of good Y; wi and ri are wage rate and rental of capital,
respectively.
Assume that the production functions for X and Y in country i are:
x a L K i ix ix ix =
- a a 1 ;           y a L K i iy iy iy =
- b b 1 . (2)6
where a i j x y ij ( , ; , ) = = 1 2 is the total factor productivity coefficient.  Since aij is country
specific, it captures the productivity difference between the two countries.  Constrained by the
production technology, the representative firm producing X in country i maximizes its profit, i.e.,
max
, L K ix i i ix i ix ix ix ix i ix i ix
ix ix
px w L r K pa L K w L r K p
a a = - - = - -
- 1 . (3)
The decision problem for a firm producing Y is similar to (3).

















































>  (that is, the X industry is capital intensive and the Y industry is
labor intensive) if and only if a b < .  Without loss of generality, we assume that the X industry
is capital intensive, ie., a b < .
Using (4) and the market clearing conditions for factors and goods in each country, we





































Clearly, p1<p2 if and only if (a2ya1x/a2xa1y)
1/(b-a)(K1L2/K2L1) > 1 under our assumption that
a b < , or iff the product of the degree of comparative technological comparative advantage
a2ya1x/a2xa1y and the degree of comparative endowment advantage K1L2/K2L1 is greater than 1.























> .  In other words, if country 1 is capital
abundant, it will have comparative advantage in the capital intensive good X.  This is the content
of the HO theorem.  However, if there is a comparative technological difference between the two
countries, which country has comparative advantage in what good depends on both relative factor
endowments and relative technological difference.  In this case the traditional HO theorem may
give the wrong prediction about comparative advantage.7
Autarky price differences provide a clue for the direction of trade flows between the 2
countries, but to examine the exact trade pattern, we need to look at the trade equilibrium.
2.2 Trade equilibrium
With international trade, the nature of the decisions for consumers and firms is similar to that
with autarky except that there are transaction costs for good imported from the foreign country.
Assume that international trade incurs ice-berg transaction costs. For each unit of goods
purchased by a consumer in country i from a foreign country, the fraction 1-ki disappears in
transit because of transaction costs. Because of transaction costs, the price of the same good may
differ between the two countries. In an interior structure, a consumer’s decision problem in
country i is:
Max Ui = (xi+ kixji)
q (yi+kiyji)
1-q, s.t. pix xi +pjx xji+p1y y1+pjy yji = w1L1 +r1K1 (5)
where pst is the  price of good t in country s, xst and yst are the amounts of the two goods,
respectively, delivered from country s to country t, ws and ks are wage rate and rental of capital in
country s, respectively. Because of transaction costs, the prices of the same good may differ
between the two countries. We first consider structure (XY)YX in which x12,  y21> 0 and x21 =
y12= 0. The first order conditions for the decision problems of representative consumers in the
two countries yield: p2y = k1p1y = k1, p1x = k2p2x. We assume that good Y produced in country 1 is
the numeraire, so that p1y = 1 and denote p = p1x , so that p2x = p/k2 and p2y =  k1.
Using the first order conditions for the decision problems of two types of firms
(producing X or producing Y) in each country and the market clearing conditions for factors in
each country, we can solve for factor prices and relative factor allocation as functions of product
prices.  We then use the world market clearing condition for goods to solve for the equilibrium
values of relative prices.8











Lix = [a/(b-a)][(bKiri/wi)- (1-b)Li], (6b)
Liy = [b/(b-a)][(1-a)Li- (aKiri/wi)],




















1/(b-a), r2/w2 = (Apa2x/k1k2Ba2y)
1/(b-a) (6d)
where A ” a
a(1-a)
1-a, B ” b
b(1-b)
1-b, Xi, and Yi are total amounts of two goods consumed in
country i, which include quantities purchased from domestic and foreign markets. X1 = x1, X2 = x2
+ k2x12,  Y2 = y2, Y1 = y1 + k1y21,
Lix  and  Liy can be greater or equal to zero. Correspondingly, there are 8 possible trade





























where (XY)YX denotes that each country produces two goods, country 1 exports good X and
country 2 exports good Y. XY denotes that each country produces only one good and country 1
exports X and imports Y. Other notations for structures in Fig. 1 have similar meaning.
Let relevant variables in (6b), which are functions of thirteen parameters, be greater than
or equal to 0, we can partition the thirteen dimension space of parameters b, a, q, Ki, Li, aiy , aix,
ki into subspaces. There may be a parameter subspace within which a particular structure is the
general equilibrium structure.  For instance, let Lix , Liy > 0 for i=1,2, we can identify the
parameter subspace for the interior structure, which is associated with the diversification cone, to
be the general equilibrium structure, and let Lix, L1y > 0 and L2y = 0, we can identify the
parameter subspace for structure (YX)X to be the general equilibrium structure.
Throughout the paper, we assume
m = (a2ya1x/a2xa1y)
1/(b-a)(K1L2/K2L1) > 1   (7)
which, together with the assumption b > a, implies that the autarky price of X in terms of Y is
lower in country 1 than in country 2. Considering a2ya1x/a2xa1y as the degree of technological
comparative advantage and K1L2/K2L1 as the degree of endowment comparative advantage, this
condition means that there exist net comparative advantages of the two types. (7) holds if there
are comparative technological and endowment advantages, or if comparative advantages of one
type dominate comparative disadvantages of the other type.
Under this assumption, we can show that the parameter subspace for structure YX to occur
in general equilibrium is empty. In structure YX,  L1x = 0, L1y > 0, L2x > 0,and L2y = 0 which
requires that (a2ya1x/a2xa1y)
1/(b-a)(K1L2/K2L1) < (k1k2)
1/(b-a)a(1-b)/b(1-a) that violates the
assumption (7) and b > a if ki˛(0, 1).  Similarly, we can show that the parameter subspaces for
structures (YX)X and Y(XY) to occur in equilibrium are empty if (7) holds.
In order to rule out structure (YX)XY, we assume x12,  y21= 0 and x21,  y12 > 0 in (5).
Following the same procedure for solving for the local equilibrium in structure (XY)YX, we can
show that the equilibrium prices in this structure are p1y=1, p1x = p, p2x = k2, p2y=   k1p and that




which is incompatible with the assumption (7) for ki˛[0, 1] and b > a. This implies that the
parameter subspace for structure (YX)XY to occur in equilibrium is empty or this structure is
ruled out from the set of candidates for equilibrium structures.
Now we consider the dividing line between structure (XY)YX and autarky. Since both
structures satisfy Lij > 0 for i = 1, 2 and j = x, y, we have to calculate the domestic excess demand
for X and Y to identify the dividing line. Inserting the equilibrium prices into the domestic excess
demand for goods yields
x1
s ‡ X1




d iff g £ g2 ” [(b-a)q+1-b](k1k2a2y/a2x)
1/(b-a)L2/K2[b(1-q)+aq]
The two semi-inequalities imply that country 1 exports X and country 2 exports Y, if and only if
g2 > g > g1 which holds only if g2 > g1




where h is a product of transaction efficiencies in the two countries and comparative
technological and endowment advantages and m represents the degree of net comparative
technological and endowment advantages. It is obvious for k1k2 = 1, g2 > g1 if and only if (7)
holds. Hence, if (7) holds and transaction costs in two countries do not outweigh net comparative
advantages of two types, then structure (XY)YX may occur in equilibrium.
As k1 and k2 decrease from 1, g2 tends to g1. If k1 and k2 are sufficiently small, it will be
true that g2 = g1 which implies that the domestic excess demand in both countries is 0, or autarky
occurs in equilibrium. Hence, the dividing line between structure (XY)YX and autarky is
h = (k1k2a2ya1x/a2xa1y)
1/(b-a)(K1L2/K2L1) = 1.
For h £ 1, autarky occurs in equilibrium for h > 1, structure (XY)YX may occur in equilibrium.
The other necessary conditions for structure (XY)YX to occur in equilibrium are 1 > Lij > 0 for i
= 1, 2 and j = x, y. The conditions hold only if
b(1-a)/a(1-b) > h > 1,
which implies that the transaction efficiencies in the two countries and net comparative
technological and endowment advantages are neither great nor small.
Alternatively, we can verify that as k1 or  k2 becomes sufficiently close to 0, autarky
occurs in equilibrium. First, note the fact that dg/d k1 > 0 and for k1k2 = 1, g > g1 where g is given11
in (7). This implies that as k1 decreases from 1 to 0, g monotonously decreases from a value
greater than g1 toward g1. As g has reached g1, the equilibrium price in structure (XY)YX
becomes the same as that in autarky (see (4) and (7)). Hence, as k1 becomes sufficiently close to
0, country 1 chooses autarky and therefore the general equilibrium is autarky. Similarly, we can
prove that as k2 becomes sufficiently close to 0, country 2 chooses autarky and therefore the
general equilibrium is autarky. Hence, if transaction efficiency in either country is too low, the
general equilibrium will be autarky. As transaction efficiencies increase, the general equilibrium
jumps from autarky to a structure with trade.
The parameter subspace for structure X(YX) to occur in equilibrium is given by
(1-a)L1(a1x/a1y)
1/(b-a) /aK1 < g < (1-a)L2(a2yk1 k2/ a2x)
1/(b-a) /aK2 and
(1-a)L2(a2y/ a2x)
1/(b-a)/aK2 > g /(k1k2)
1/(b-a) > (1-b)L2(a2y/ a2x)
1/(b-a)/bK2.
The first expression holds only if k1k2 is sufficiently large, compared to other parameters. Since
d[g/(k1k2)
1/(b-a)]/dk2 < 0, the second expression implies that k2 is neither too great nor too small,
compared to other parameters. Hence, for give values of other parameters, the general
equilibrium occurs in structure X(XY) if transaction efficiency is neither too high nor too low in
country 2, while it is high in country 1.
The parameter subspace for structure (XY)Y to occur in equilibrium is given by
(1-b)L1(a1x/a1y)




 > (1-b)L1(a1y/ a1x)
1/(b-a)/bK1.
The second expression holds only if k1k2 is sufficiently large, compared to other parameters.
Since dg/dk1 > 0, the first expression implies that k1 is neither too great nor too small, compared
to other parameters. Hence, for give values of other parameters, the general equilibrium occurs in
structure (XY)Y if transaction efficiency is neither too high nor too low in country 1, while it is
high in country 2.12
The inframarginal comparative statics are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: General Equilibrium and Its Inframarginal Comparative Statics
h < 1 ˛[1, b(1-a)/a(1-b)]
k k1 and/or k2
are small
k1 and k2 are neither
great nor small
k1 is great and k2 is
neither great nor small




Autarky (XY)YX X(YX) (XY)Y
h > b(1-a)/a(1-b)
k k1 is great and k2 is
neither great nor small
k1 and k2 are great k2 is great  and k1 is




where h ” (k1k2)
1/(b-am = (k1k2a2ya1x/a2xa1y)
1/(b-a)(K1L2/K2L1), and b(1-a)/a(1-b) > 1 > a(1-b)/b(1-
a) > 0. h is a product of transaction efficiencies in the two countries and net comparative
technological and endowment advantages and m represents the degree of net comparative
technological and endowment advantages.
Table 1 indicates that under our assumption (7), autarky and four different trade patterns
can occur in equilibrium depending on parameter values.  All the trade patterns feature country 1
exporting good X.  (It can be shown that if we reverse our assumption (7), the other four trade
patterns will occur in equilibrium each featuring country 1 exporting good Y).
4
Our assumption (7) holds if we assume that country 1 is capital abundant (K1/L1>K2/L2)
and X is capital intensive (b>a) and that country 1 has no comparative technological
disadvantage in producing X, (a1x/a1y ‡ a2x/a2y). Hence, the results in Table 1 are consistent with
the traditional HO theorem, that is, country 1 exports the good (X) that uses its abundant factor
(K) intensively, if a1x/a1y ‡ a2x/a2y.  However, if country 1 has comparative technological
disadvantage in producing X (ie, a1x/a1y < a2x/a2y ), then whether the traditional HO theorem
                                                
4 Drabicki and Takayama (1979) use a model of three goods to show that a country may import the good that is
cheaper under autarky (or export the good that is more expensive under autarky). The world commodity price rations
need not fall between the corresponding price ranges under autarky. A similar example is also provided in Dixit and
Norman (1980, pp. 95-96).13
holds depends on whether country 1’s comparative endowment advantage dominates the
comparative technological disadvantage in producing X.
Hence, our model shows that the HO theorem can stand the test of the endogenization of
prices of goods and factors as well as the test of inframarginal comparative statics analysis of
general equilibrium.  However, it needs to be refined if there are transaction costs and/or
differences in production technology.  The refined HO theorem can take the following form.
Proposition 1: Provided transaction efficiencies are not too low in the two countries, capital
abundant country exports capital intensive good if it has no comparative technological
disadvantage in producing this good or if the technological disadvantage is dominated by its
comparative endowment advantage. Otherwise the country exports labor intensive good.  If
transaction efficiency is very low in either country, the general equilibrium occurs in autarky. As
transaction efficiencies in both countries are slightly improved, the equilibrium jumps to the
structure in which each country produces two goods and trades with the other country. As
transaction efficiency in one country is further improved, the equilibrium jumps to a structure in
which the country with higher transaction efficiency completely specializes and receives most of
gains from trade, while the other country produces two goods. As transaction efficiencies in both
countries are further improved, the equilibrium jumps to the structure in which each country
completely specializes. For given transaction conditions, an increase in the degree of
comparative technological and/or endowment advantage will shift the equilibrium from autarky
to a low level of division of labor and trade, then to a high level of trade and complete
specialization of both countries.
For convenience of presentation, we assume kI to be 1 and focus the effects of comparative
technological advantage on the other core theorems in sections 3, 4, and 5. We shall then
examine the effects of transaction costs on the theorems in section 6.
3.  The Factor Price Equalization Theorem
The factor price equalization theorem predicts that international trade will equalize factor
prices in the trading countries even though the factors are immobile across countries (Samuelson,14
1948, 1953).  This prediction has been mostly inconsistent with empirical evidence.  There are
various explanations for the inconsistence.  We look at two here.  The first explanation is the
well-recognized result that if the general equilibrium occurs outside the diversification cone, the
factor price equalization theorem does not hold.  The second was that international productivity
differences account for much of the differences in factor prices (Leontief, 1956 and Trefler,
1993).  We analyze the two explanations in turn.
The concept of the diversification cone was developed in the 1950s (see Lerner, 1952, and
McKenzie, 1956).  It is defined as the range of factor endowments within which a country
produces both goods for given prices.  The focus of the concept on factor endowments is
probably due to that factor endowments are the only exogenous variables besides commodity
prices in those early trade models.  In our model, however, the diversification cone should be
understood as the parameter subspace within which both countries produce both goods in
equilibrium.  The parameters include relative consumer preference, technology and endowments.
Specifically, the diversification cone in our model is defined by the following system of
inequalities:
L L x y 1 1 0 0 > > ; ; L L x y 2 2 0 0 > > ; .



























and      g˛((1-b)(a2y/a2x)
1/(b-a)L2/bK2, (1-a)(a1y/a1x)
1/(b-a)L1/aK1).  (8b)
where g is given in (6). Note that in condition (8a), [(1-a)/a]/[(1-b)/b] > 1 iff b>a (iff good X
is capital intensive). [(1-a)/a]/[(1-b)/b] can be interpreted as labor intensity in the Y sector
relative to the X sector, or the capital intensity in the X sector relative to the Y sector. We may
measure technological comparative advantage by a1xa2y/a1ya2x and comparative endowment
advantage between the two countries by K1L2/L1K2. Condition (8a) implies each country’s
comparative advantage in producing the good that is intensive of the factor which is abundant in
this country is not too great and/or the capital intensity of good X relative to good Y is great. (8b)
implies that relative taste for two goods is in balance with relative population size and relative
productivity between the two countries. If the comparative advantage is too great and/or the
relative intensity is too small, equilibrium will be structure XY which is outside the15
diversification cone and involves complete specialization of each country. If the relative taste is
not in balance with relative population size and relative productivity, one country will be
completely specialized in structure X(YX) or (XY)Y. This condition in terms of a parameter
subspace for the diversification cone is much more accurate than the conventional condition in
terms of prices. It, together with (7), indicates that the parameter subspace for the diversification
cone is very small. This subspace requires comparative advantage in technology and in
endowment is nether too great nor too small.
Outside the diversification cone, the factor price equalization theorem does not hold.  For
instance, in structure XY, factor prices in country 1 are,
w1 = a pa1x(K1/L1)
 1-a, r1 = (1-a) pa1x(K1/L1)
-a,




a is the equilibrium price of good X in terms of good Y.
Factor prices in country 2 are:
 w2 = ba2y(K2/L2)
1-b, r2 = (1-b)a2y(K2/L2)
-b.
Clearly, w1 „  w2, r1 „ r2, except for trivial razor edge cases.
Even within the diversification cone, the factor prices are still not equalized. The factor
prices in country 1 and country 2 in structure (XY)(YX) are:
w1 = a pa1x(K1x/L1x)
 1-a, r1 = (1-a) pa1x(K1x/L1x)
-a, (9a)
w2 = a pa2x(K1x/L1x)(a1xa2y/a2xa1y)
(1-a)/(b-a),
r2 = (1-a) pa2x(K1s/L1s)
-a (a1xa2y/a2xa1y)
(1-a)/(b-a) (9b)
where p is given in (6). A comparison between (9a) and (9b) shows
w1 £ w2 iff  (a1x/a2x)
(1-b)(a2y/a1y)
1-a ‡ 1 (9c)
r1 ‡ r2 iff  (a1x/a2x)
b(a2y/a1y)
a ‡ 1              (9d)
(9c) and (9d) implies that the country that has comparative technological advantage in the capital
intensive good is likely to have higher rental rate and lower wage rate than the other country.
This is consistent with Leontief’s (1956) view that the difference between factor prices can be
explained by productivity differences.
The analysis in this section is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2  The general equilibrium occurs within the diversification cone if each country’s
comparative advantage is not too great, the relative intensity of capital to labor in X sector is16
sufficiently greater than in Y sector, and relative taste is in balance with the two country’s
relative population size and relative productivity.  If comparative advantage is sufficiently great
and/or the relative factor intensity is sufficiently small, the general equilibrium entails complete
specialization of each country. If relative taste is not in balance with relative population size and
relative productivity, one country completely specializes and the other produces both goods in
equilibrium.
Within the diversification cone, the factor price equalization theorem holds only if there
is no productivity difference between the trading countries or the relative productivity between
two countries in producing two goods is in balance according to equalities in (9c, d).  If a
country has comparative technological advantage in the capital (labor) intensive good, its rental
(wage) is likely to be higher and its wage (rental) lower than in the other country.
4.  The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
The SS theorem states that if the price of the capital-intensive (or labor-intensive) good rises,
the price of capital (or labor) rises, and in greater proportion to the commodity price increase; the
price of labor falls, but necessarily in greater proportion to the commodity price increase (Stolper
and Sammuelson, 1941).  Since with the opening-up of international trade, the price of a
country’s comparative advantage good rises, a corollary of the SS theorem is that international
trade benefits a country’s abundant factor and hurts its scarce factor or a tariff benefits a
country’s scarce factor. 
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We check the validity of the SS theorem in our model in 3 steps: we examine whether it
holds (1) within the diversification cone; (2) outside the diversification cone; and (3) when the
general equilibrium jumps from one structure to another.
(1) Does the SS theorem hold within the diversification cone?
First, consider an increase in total factor productivity of X in country 1 due to a neutral
technological progress (ie., an increase in a1x).   Differentiation of (6c) with respect to a1x yields
dp/da1x < 0 always holds (10a)
d(r1/w1)/da1x > 0 iff [g/a1x(b-a)]+(dg/ a1x)>0. (10b)
                                                
5 Grossman and Levinsohn (1989) show that the specific factors model captures reality more closely than the SS
theorem for many U.S. industries.17
It can be shown that (10) and the condition for general equilibrium to occur within the




















where m ” [(b-a)q+1-b]/[b-q(b-a)]. (11) holds for a value of a that is sufficiently close to 0,
since m and the left hand side are limited positive values while the right hand side of (11) tends to
infinity as a tends to 0. This means that there exists a parameter subspace within the
diversification cone, defined by (11), such that an increase in a1x  leads to an increase in the price
of capital intensive good (X), but a decrease in the rental for capital.  This result is clearly
inconsistent with the SS theorem. Similarly, we can prove that there exist parameter subspaces
such that other non-neutral technical changes may generate changes in prices that are inconsistent
with the SS theorem.
Next, consider a non-neutral technical change that raises the relative productivity of capital
to labor in producing X (ie., an increase in a).  To show the SS theorem may not hold within the
diversification cone even in the original HO model with no technical difference between the
countries, we  assume aij = 1. The differentiation of (6c) with respect to a yields
dp/da > 0 iff -ln[a/(1-a)][b-q(b-a)][(b-a)q+1-b]>qA (12a)
d(r/w)/da < 0 always holds.           (12b)
It is easy to see that (12a) holds if a is sufficiently close to 0.  We can also show that (12) and the
condition for the general equilibrium to occur within the diversification cone hold simultaneously
if
-ln[a/(1-a)][b-q(b-a)][(b-a)q+1-b]>a[(L1+L2)K1/(K1+K2)L1 (13)
Inequality (13) holds if a is sufficiently close to 0.  Hence, for a sufficiently small a, an increase
in a raises the price of the capital intensive good and at the same time reduce the rental for
capital within the diversification cone.
This result is intuitive. A change in a indirectly affects r/w through interdependence
between r/w and p (a change in a affects p which in turn affects r/w), given in the first expression
in (6c). This effect is counted by the SS theorem. However, the change in a has a direct effect on
r/w too, as shown in the second expression in (6c), which is not counted by the SS theorem. If the18
direct and indirect effect have the same sign, then the SS theorem holds. But if the two effects are
opposite, then the SS theorem does not hold when the direct effect dominates the indirect one. In
other words, the SS theorem ignores some interdependencies and feedback loops between factor
and commodity markets, between consumption and production, between prices and quantities,
and between different agents’ self-interested behaviors. The ignorance is due to the assumption
of exogenous commodity prices when the SS theorem was proved.
We now consider a change in taste (q) or endowments (Li. Ki, i=1,2).   From (6c), it is
clear that the inter-relationship between p and r/w is independent of changes in taste or
endowments, and that a change in taste or endowment affects p and r/w in the same direction.  In
other words, the SS theorem holds.
Summarizing the above analysis, we have
Proposition 3  Within the diversification cone, price movements are consistent with the SS
theorem if changes in prices are due to changes in taste or endowment; price movements may be
inconsistent with the SS theorem if the changes in prices are due to changes in production
parameters. This is true even if technological difference is absent.
(2)  Does the SS theorem hold outside the diversification cone?
The well known answer to this question is negative. We need to solve for the local
equilibrium in each structure to formalize the answer.  The approach is similar to the one we used
to solve for the local equilibrium in the interior structure (the solution presented in (6)). The
equilibrium in autarky and in structures (XY)Y, XY, X(YX) are summarized as follows:
Autarky:  pi = (aiy/aix)(ri/wi)
b-aB/A, ri/wi = Li m /Ki (14)
xi = aix A(bm-1+b)Li
aKi 
1-a/(b-a)m, yi = aiy b(1-a-am)Li
bKi 
1-b/(b-a)m
Kix = (1-a)(bm-1+b)Ki/(b-a)m, Kiy = (1-b)(1-a-am)Ki/(b-a)m
Lix = aKix ri/wi(1-a), Liy = bKiy ri/wi(1-b).
where m ” [(b-a)q+1-b]/[b-q(b-a)].










r2/w2 = (1-b)L2/bK2,  w2 = ba2y (K2/L2)
1-b,
x1 = a1x L1
aK1
1-a,  y2 = a2yL2
bK2
1-b,








1-b = 0 (16a)
r1/w1 = (a1xAp/a1yB) 
1/(b-a), w1 = a1xAp(a1yB/a1xAp)
(1-a)/(b-a), (16b)
r2/w2 = (1-b)L2/K2b,  w2 = a2yB [bK2/L2(1-b)]
1-b. (16c)
Structure X(YX): Symmetric to structure (XY)Y.
First consider structure XY.  Differentiation of prices in structure XY with respect to
different parameters yields
d(ri/wi)/dq = 0 and dp/dq > 0.
d(ri/wi)/daij = 0, dp/da2y „ 0, and dp/da1x „ 0;
d(r1/w1)/da < 0 and dp/da > 0 if K1>L1;
d(r1/w1)/d L1 > 0 and dp/dL1 < 0.
None of the above relationships between r/w and p is consistent with the SS theorem.
Next consider structures (XY)Y and X(YX).  Because of the symmetry between the two
structures, we can focus on structure (XY)Y.  Let’s first look at country 1.  (16b) indicates that
the relationship between r1/w1 and p is independent of  the taste or endowment parameter. Hence,
any change in taste or endowment parameter will affect the prices of goods and the prices of
factors in the same direction, that is, the SS theorem holds.
From (16a), we have
¶F/¶p > 0, ¶F/¶q > 0, ¶F/¶a1x > 0, ¶F/¶a1y < 0, ¶F/¶a2y < 0
And the application of the implicit function theorem to the above yields
dp/dq = -(¶F/¶q)/(¶F/¶p) < 0, dp/da1x = -(¶F/¶a1x)/(¶F/¶p) < 0, (17a)
dp/da1y = -(¶F/¶a1y)/(¶F/¶p) > 0, dp/da2y = -(¶F/¶a2y)/(¶F/¶p) > 0.
Similarly, we can prove
dp/dKi < 0, dp/dLi > 0 for i = 1, 2. (17b)20
Following the method to prove proposition 3, we can prove that there exist parameter subspaces
such that changes in a1x, a1y, a, or b will generate changes in prices that are inconsistent with the
SS theorem.
For country 2, we have
d(r2/w2)/dq = 0, d(r2/w2)/da1x = 0, d(r2/w2)/da1y = 0, d(r2/w2)/da2y = 0 (18)
d(r2/w2)/dL1 = 0, d(r2/w2)/dL2 > 0, d(r2/w2)/dK1 = 0, d(r2/w2)/dK2 < 0
(17)  and (18) indicate that the changes in prices caused by changes in parameters of tastes,
production technology, and endowments may be inconsistent with the SS theorem.
Summarising the above, we have
Proposition 4 In the structure where both countries completely specialize, price movements are
inconsistent with the SS theorem.  In the structure where only one country completely specializes,
price movements are inconsistent with the SS theorem for the country that completely specializes.
For the country which produces both goods, price movements are inconsistent with the SS
theorem if the price changes are due to production parameter changes, but consistent if the price
changes are due to taste or endowment changes.
The implications of this proposition are more important if deserved attention is paid to the fact
that the parameter subspace for the general equilibrium to occur within the diversification cone is
much smaller than the subspace within which the general equilibrium occurs outside the
diversification cone.
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(3) Does the SS theorem hold when the general equilibrium jumps from one structure to another?
Now consider the case when general equilibrium jumps from structure (XY)YX where both
countries produce both goods, to structure XY where both countries completely specialize.
Comparing the local equilibrium in structure (XY)YX with that in structure XY, we find that
for country 1, the ratio of capital rental to wage rate is higher in structure XY than in the interior
structure with trade iff
                                                
6 For a more recent example in which the wage-rental ratios of two trading countries diverge in the presence of two
factor internsity reversal, see Deardorf (1980). Thompson (1986) examines the possibility of factor price polarization
in a three-factor, two-sector model.21
g < (1-a)L1(a1y/a1x)
1/(b-a)/K1a (19)















This means that there exists a parameter subspace such that the ratio of capital rental to wage is
higher and the price of capital intensive good is lower in country 1 in structure XY than in
structure (XY)YX.
It can be shown that within an appropriate interval of parameter values, an increase in a, in
K1/L1, or in a1xa2y/a1ya2x, a decrease in b or in K2/L2 will make the general equilibrium
discontinuously jump from structure (XY)YX to structure XY. If parameter values are within the
subspace that is defined by (20) and (21), then the changes in prices caused by the jump are
inconsistent with the SS theorem.
The above analysis is summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 5: A change in parameters that causes a jump of general equilibrium from the
structure with incomplete specialization for both countries to one with complete specialization of
each country may generate price changes that are inconsistent with the SS theorem.
Our analysis in this section suggests that the SS theorem cannot stand the test of the
endogenization of commodity prices nor survive the inframarginal comparative statics analysis.
The SS theorem holds only within the diversification cone when changes in prices are caused by
changes in taste or endowment parameters.
5. The Rybczynski Theorem
The Rybczynski theorem states that at given commodity price, if the endowment of some
resources increases, the industry that uses that resource most intensively will increase its output,
while the other industry reduces its output (Rybczynski, 1955).  We examine whether this
theorem remains valid in our model where the commodity price is endogenous.22
Consider the autarky structure.   Without loss of generality, suppose the capital endowment
in country i (Ki) increases.  If the content of the Rybczynski theorem holds true, then the capital-
intensive X industry would expand, (i.e., ¶xi/¶Ki > 0), and the labor-intensive Y industry would
shrink (i.e., ¶yi/¶Ki < 0).  The differentiation of (8) with respect to Ki yields ¶xi/¶Ki > 0 and
¶yi/¶Ki > 0. This implies that part of the RY theorem does not hold when commodity price is
endogenized.
Now look at structure XY.  From (15), we have ¶x1/¶L1 > 0, ¶x1/¶L2 = 0, ¶x1/¶K1 > 0,
¶x1/¶K2 = 0, ¶y2/¶L1 = 0, ¶y2/¶K1 = 0, ¶y2/¶L2 > 0, ¶y2/¶K2 > 0.  These are clearly inconsistent
with the RY theorem. It can also be shown that there exists parameter subspace such that ¶x1/¶L1
> 0, and ¶x1/¶K1 > 0 in the structure (XY)YX. It is not difficult to find an example that a change
in an endowment parameter causes a shift of general equilibrium from a structure to another and
generates changes in outputs that are inconsistent with the RY theorem. Hence, we conclude:
Proposition 6: The RY theorem cannot survive the test of endogenization of commodity prices.
With endogenous commodity price, the output of both industries can increase in response to an
increase in the endowment of some resource. The RY theorem cannot survive the test of
inframarginal comparative statics analysis either.
6. Transaction costs
In the absence of transaction cost, autarky cannot be the general equilibrium (or the
parameter subspace for autarky to be equilibrium is empty). Hence, opening up of international
trade is ad hoc and a shift of the general equilibrium from autarky to the division of labor and a
high level of trade dependence is yet to be endogenized.
Proposition 1 summarizes inframarginal comparative statics of general equilibrium that
relate to effects of changes in transaction conditions on trade structure. Table 1 partitions 13-
dimension parameter space into many subspaces. The inframarginal comparative statics
rigorously describe the degree to which changes in a parameter can be substituted by changes in
another parameter in generating discontinuous jumps of trade structure. Hence, the statement that
improvements in transaction conditions can increase level of division of labor and related degree
of trade dependence is not a simple tautology. In particular, proposition 1 implies that as23
transaction efficiency is improved, total transaction cost may increase due to the increase in the
equilibrium trade volume. This is supported by empirical evidence found in North (1986), which
indicates that the employment share of the transaction sector increased as transaction conditions
were improved in the USA in the last century.
Our iceberg transaction cost in this model is equivalent to a tax system that uses all tax
revenue to pay bureaucrats who collect tax. Hence, our model can be used to analyze effects of
tariff that incurs significant bureaucracy cost. We leave full general equilibrium analysis of tariff
revenue transfer to future research. The SS theorem was originally motivated to investigate
effects of tariff on income distribution. It seems to predict that as the home country increases
tariff, the price of good that is intensive of the factor that is scarce in home country increases, so
that the scarce factor is benefited. But this is not a general equilibrium analysis of tariff and
transaction costs. First, it ignores possible inframarginal effect of tariff and transaction costs on a
discontinuous shift of trade structure. As shown in Table 1, tariff and associated transaction costs
may generate jumps between structures A, XY, and (XY)YX that may be inconsistent with the
SS theorem if the inframarginal effects of tariff are opposite to marginal effects.
Second, proposition 1 implies that as the transaction efficiency in a country unilaterally
decreases compared to another country, the general equilibrium may shift from structure XY to
an asymmetric structure where this country produces two goods and most of gains from trade go
to the other country. This is because in an asymmetric structure, terms of international trade are
determined by terms of domestic trade in the country producing two goods. This formalizes the
common sense that even if tariff may marginally change terms of trade and increase income of
abundant factors, it may inframarginally hurt abundant factor by reducing level of trade and
associated gains.
Finally, we prove that even within the diversification cone and aij = 1, the SS theorem
may not hold if price movements are caused by changes in transaction conditions. Suppose that
the equilibrium occurs in structure (XY)YX, so that the equilibrium prices are given by (6).
Country 2’s terms of trade is P ” p2y/p1x = k1/p, where p2y is the price of good Y in country 2 in
terms of good Y in country 1, p ” p1x is the price of good X in terms of good Y in country 1. The
differentiation of (6d) yields
d(r2/w2)/dk2 = ¶(r2/w2)/¶k2 + [¶(r2/w2)/¶P](dP/dk2)24
where ¶(r2/w2)/¶k2 < 0, ¶(r2/w2)/¶P < 0, and dP/dk2 = - k1dp/p
2dk2 is ambiguous since dp/dk2 is
positive within a parameter subspace and negative within the other subspace. If dp/dk2 > 0, the
sign of ¶(r2/w2)/¶k2 is opposite to that of [¶(r2/w2)/¶P](dP/dk2). Therefore, the SS theorem may
not hold if the indirect effect of a change in k2 on r2/w2 dominates direct effect. The prediction of
the SS theorem even within the diversification cone may be wrong if price movements are caused
by changes in transaction conditions because some feedback loops between price differentials in
two countries, transaction conditions, production and consumption in the two countries are
ignored by the SS theorem.
Let aij = 1 in (6d). A comparison between relative factor prices in the two countries
indicates that the relative factor prices are equal between the two countries only if k1k2 = 1, or
only if transaction cost is zero. It is also obvious that the RY theorem may not hold within the
diversification cone if there are transaction costs. The result is summarized as follows.
Proposition 7: If price movements are caused by changes in transaction conditions, the SS
theorem may not hold outside or within the diversification cone. The RY theorem and factor
equalization theorem do not hold if there are transaction costs for international trade.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced technological comparative advantage and transaction
costs into the HO model and conducted an inframarginal comparative statics analysis of general
equilibrium. The HO theorem holds in all trade structures, but it needs to be refined to
accommodate comparative technological advantage and transaction costs.  The SS theorem holds
only within the diversification cone when changes in prices are caused by changes in taste or
endowment parameters.  It may not hold if the changes are caused by changes in production
parameters. This is true even if technical difference between countries and transaction costs are
absent. The SS theorem may not hold if the changes in prices are caused by changes in
transaction cost parameters. We have also refined the RY theorem and factor price equalization
theorem.
Our exercise has highlighted the limitations of two types of partial equilibrium analysis.
Type I partial equilibrium analysis is to assume exogenous prices of goods (or factors), then25
investigate changes in prices of factors (or output) in response to changes in prices of goods (or
endowment parameters). This is a partial equilibrium analysis since in general equilibrium all
prices are endogenized.  Such a partial equilibrium analysis could be misleading since the model
is not closed and some interdependencies and feedback loops between prices and quantities,
between consumption and production, between the markets for goods and factors, and between
different agents’ self-interested decisions are ignored. Type II partial equilibrium analysis is
confined within the interior structure, ignoring corner structures. It does not partition the
parameter space into subspaces within each of which a particular interior or corner equilibrium is
the general equilibrium; and it totally ignores the implications of the partition of the parameter
space for comparative statics. Type II partial equilibrium analysis also ignores discontinuous
jumps of general equilibrium between different trade patterns.
The two type partial equilibrium analyses differ from Marshallian partial equilibrium
analysis which focuses on only one market.  The two type partial equilibrium analyses consider
all markets and some (but not all) interactions between the markets. Possibly because in many
cases the two type partial equilibrium analyses provide a fuller picture than the Marshallian
partial equilibrium analysis, their limitations have not received much attention, while the
shortcomings of the Marshallian analysis is well-known.
We are cautious about implications of our results for policy purposes since our results are
obtained from a specific model. If we change the functional forms, the results may change too.
However, the value of our exercise lies that it has demonstrated that obsession with very general
results can have high costs.  As indicated in everything possible theorem (Sonnenschein, 1973,
Mantel, 1974, and Debreu, 1974), the comparative statics of general equilibrium that are as
general as the compensated demand law (comparative statics of decisions) are impossible to
obtain in the absence of explicit specification of models. The comparative statics of general
equilibrium, which are the main sources of the explaining power of economics, are model
structure specific, functional form specific, and parameter value specific.  Thus there is good
reason to doubt the validity of some very general comparative statics results of general
equilibrium in the absence of explicit specification of models. We should be very cautious when
we make policy recommendations on the basis of some comparative statics of general26
equilibrium, which are valid only for a specific model structure, for specific functional forms,
and for a specific subspace of parameter values.
Further research can explicitly specify tariff and introduce local increasing returns, which
no doubt will enrich the implications of the model, but which is likely to make the model more
difficult to manage.27
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